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DESTABILIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
On December 9, 1982 helicopters dropped a heavily armed force of one hundred South African commandos into Maseru, Lesotho. 
The commando force hit twelve separate sites in and around Maseru, using bazookas, machine guns, grenades, and incendiary 
devices to blast through doors, demolish houses, and kill those inside. Most of the forty-two victims of this raid were black South 
African refugees. Other victims were Lesotho women and children who happened to be in or near target houses. 
The raid on Lesotho is but one of many examples of what Congressman Howard Wolpe has described as a "dangerous develop-
ment of escalating instability" in southern Africa. As the countries in southern Africa have attained majority rule, Pretoria has 
engaged in a systematic and sustained campaign of military and economic destabilization throughout the region. The destruction 
of human beings and vital economic installations has been enormous in countries such as Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. 
South Africa's aggression has even extended as far as the far-flung Seychelles. 
Despite protests from the target countries and condemnation from the international community, South Africa continues to threaten 
its neighbors with economic reprisals and military strikes with impunity. Indeed, although the Reagan administration claims to 
be interested in restoring "regional peace and stability," it has done little-if anything-to raise the costs of South African aggression. 
This ISSUE BRIEF will discuss these and related issues, beginning with an interview with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda 
conducted by TransAfrica Forum's Executive Director, Randall Robinson. □ 
How would you describe the South African efforts to 
destabilize the adjoining countries? 
KAUNDA: Perhaps, the place to begin is my recent 
meeting with Prime Minister Botha. We, as Frontline 
countries, continue to observe the policy worked out by 
African member-states of the OAU in Lusaka, which has 
been called the "Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa." 
We recognize the right of the white people in southern 
Africa to live as ordinary human beings. It is not the black 
majority that has rejected the white minority. It is the 
white minority in control of political power, of economic 
power, of social and cultural power, of scientific and 
technological power, and of defense and security power 
who have rejected the majority. 
We can only conclude that by doing what they are do-
Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda 
ing the racist South African government wants to push 
back the line of genuinely independent states, to create 
puppet states which they will be able to control, and 
thereby to rob the indigenous peoples of these countries 
of the genuine independence which they enjoy today. 
Every country in southern Africa today has suffered 
in one way or another the destabilization process. Angola 
has been attacked several times . Even now as we are 
speaking, there are racist troops on Angolan soil. 
Botswana has come under attack from time to time, so 
they suffer from the same destabilization process . In 
Lesotho the same thing occurs: racist puppets attacked 
the Lesotho's Prime Minister's home and ran away into 
South Africa. 
IT IS NOT NELSON MANDELA NOR OLIVER 
TAMBO ... WHO ARE GOING TO BRING COM-
MUNISM TO SOUTH AFRICA. BOTHA AND HIS 
SUPPORTERS ARE GOING TO BRING COM-
MUNISM-WHICH THE U.S. FEARS SO MUCH-
TO SOUTH AFRICA. 
In Mozambique they have orgaruzed thousands of pup-
pets, who they have sent to destabilize the government. 
There is a serious attempt to overthrow the government 
as they are doing in Angola. In Swaziland a different type 
of destabilization continues. In Zambia twice they have 
trained terrorists to overthrow our government-a 
government elected by the people of Zambia. In Zim-
babwe they have taken over Muzorewa's gangsters, and 
they are training them now. As you can see, there is not 
one country among the Frontline States that has not in 
one way or another faced this continuing program of 
destabilization by racist South Africa. 
How would you describe the difference in South African 
behavior before and since the election of the Reagan 
administration? 
KAUNDA: It is difficult to say whether or not there has 
been any difference in approach by the South Africans 
to our situation in southern Africa. The only way in which 
change could be measured is in relation to certain actions 
South Africa might take. They could solve the Namibian 
issue by withdrawing from the country and by allowing 
the people of Namibia to elect their own government and 
to live in peace thereafter. They could also stop this pro-
cess of destabilization to which I referred earlier. There-
fore, I cannot say with a clear conscience that there has 
been any change because I have not seen it. Moreover, 
I haven't seen anything to make me believe that there will 
be some change to come. 
Why did you decide to meet with Prime Minister Botha? 
KAUNDA: I have said before that if the problem is not 
solved quickly it is going to explode very violently. If it 
should explode, it is going to make the French Revolu-
tion look like a Sunday morning children's picnic . Apart 
from the 24 million people in South Africa, it will affect 
everyone in southern Africa when it explodes. We are all 
in a small canoe sailing on the Zambezi River. We are 
moving toward cataracts very soon. If this small canoe 
capsizes , we all will perish. 
Never before, have we had a situation in which the 
"haves" are all of one color and a minority while the 
"have nots" are all of one color and a majority . This 
very powerful minority is supported by the powerful 
forces which we humanists call forces of exploitative in-
ternational capitalism and its off-shoots of imperialism, 
colonialism, neo-colonialism, zionism, faci sm, racism , 
and apartheid. 
Has American investment in South Africa underpinned 
their capacity to destabilize their neighbors? 
KAUNDA: Precisely. I am not accusing the U.S. govern-
ment, or the West German government, or the French 
government. Monopoly multinationals are not under the 
control of any government; they are powers unto them-
selves. They have invested in South Africa because they 
want to make huge profits. That suits the Boers in South 
Africa. They do not want change there at all. 
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As has happened in Zimbabwe, in Zambia, in Mozam-
bique, and in Angola, when the people themselves take 
power, the distribution of wealth takes on a new 
character. Governments of the people, by the people, and 
for the people are established. They are going to produce 
wealth and to distribute it to fit the needs and re-
quirements of all the people. This is what the Boers do 
not want to see. This is not what monopoly capitalists 
would like to see happen in South Africa. So the two of 
them have come together to exploit the masses of South 
Africa's people. 
How should the United States government respond to 
South African destabilization attempts? What is wrong 
with current American policy? 
KAUNDA: I know of no government today which clear-
ly has as much influence with the South African govern-
ment as the U.S. government has. Therefore, the U.S. 
has a very grave responsibility with respect to the ex-
plosive southern African situation. I am not in a posi-
tion to lecture your government as to how to go about 
bringing majority rule to South Africa; but even in the 
selfish interest of the investor, they have to do something 
and do something quickly. Time is not with us; time is 
running short. 
It is not Nelson Mandela nor Oliver Tambo nor other 
leaders in South African jails or who are outside South 
Africa fighting for their rights who are going to bring 
communism to South Africa. Botha and his supporters 
are going to bring communism-which the U .S. fears so 
much-to South Africa. 
Nothing can stop the young people of South Africa 
from fighting for their independence. Western capitals 
will not offer them weapons to fight against their own 
investment in South Africa. The only countries that pro-
vide training and weapons are Eastern, socialist countries 
whose ideology is Marxism-Leninism. 
Western countries cannot have their cake and eat it too. 
When South African young people train in use of these 
weapons, obviously ideology follows . When we are deal-
ing with the question of communism, we should look not 
at the effect but at the course. Those who do not want 
communist ideology to envelope South Africa must re-
move the cause-the cancer that is killing South Africa. 
The Russians are not responsible; they have no way 
to get into South Africa except via freedom fighters. To 
stop the freedom fighters from going to Russia or to 
China, one must stop the cause that makes them leave 
South Africa and train in the usage of those weapons. 
Will change come to South Africa in the next ten or fif-
teen years? 
KAUNDA: I don't give those people more than five 
years before an explosion takes place. Oh no! We don' t 
have that much time. If South Africa does not change 
now, an explosion is inevitable. Watch the next three, 
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Although none of 
the countries in south-
ern Africa has escaped 
Pretoria's destabili-
zation attempts, 
Angola has been par-
ticularly victimized. 
Angolan President 
Jose Eduardo dos San-
tos has estimated that South Africa has subjected his 
country to more than $10 billion in "material damage" 
since 1975 . Whether this estimate includes such incidents 
as the seizing of more than $200 million in arms during 
a major South African operation last year, attacks con-
ducted solely by the anti-government National Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola (UNIT A), or joint 
UNIT A-South Africa attacks is unclear. At any rate, the 
extent of the damage has been undeniably tremendous. 
South Africa's attacks on Angola have been numerous 
and have incorporated at least four types of activities: 
• Attacks on South West Africa People's Organiza-
tion (SW APO) and African National Congress 
(ANC) refugee camps. 
• Financial and logistical support for UNIT A in wag-
ing its armed insurrection against the Angolan gov-
ernment. 
• Sabotage of economic targets such as refineries, oil 
pipelines, and bridges. 
MOZAMBIQUE 
COMO ROS 
For the past several 
years, South Africa 
has also been waging 
an undeclared war 
against neighboring 
Mozambique. In 
January 1981 South 
African forces 
attacked the suburbs 
of Maputo, the Mozambican capital. In August 1982 
Ruth First, an outspoken critic of apartheid, was 
assassinated by a letter bomb mailed to her office at the 
University of Eduardo Mondlane. Several days later, 
South African troops landed in southern Mozambique. 
In an ominous warning, South African Defense 
Minister Magnus Malan has since stated that his country 
might find it necessary to initiate a "Lebanese-type in-
vasion" of Mozambique. Indeed, the Mozambican 
representative to the United Nations has reported a 
massive build-up of South African troops and military 
equipment along its border. 
As in Angola, Pretoria's principal weapon against 
Mozambique has been an anti-government guerrilla 
movement, the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). 
Both former Rhodesian intelligence chief Ken Flowers 
and former South African spy Gordon Winter claim 
credit for their respective governments for the organiza-
tion of the MNR. In either case, from 1976 until the sign-
• Bombing, military invasion, and occupation of im-
portant parts of southern Angola. 
Pretoria's most recent offensive against Angola began 
in June 1982 in the midst of the delicate Namibia negotia-
tions. According to the South African commander in 
Namibia, Major General Charles Lloyd, his troops would 
remain in Angola until a cease-fire in the Namibian con-
flict has been declared. 
The foray into southern Angola, beginning on June 
11th, was the most intense since the South African inva-
sion of the preceding year in which it claimed to have 
killed more than one thousand SW APO guerillas. On Ju-
ly 16th, the South African forces attacked two suspected 
SW APO bases at Evale and Ionde which were eighty 
miles inside Angolan territory only to find them deserted . 
On August 10th, Lloyd's troops clashed with SWAPO 
guerrillas further to the north at Tecamutete, killing more 
than one hundred insurgents according to South African 
reports. 
It is ironic, of course, that South Africa sees this type 
of invasion as a means of forcing the Angolan's hands 
with respect to the presence of Cuban troops. If enough 
pressure can be applied, they reason, then Angola can 
be forced to send the Cuban troops home. On December 
8th, the two governments held their first publicly ac-
knowledged discussions since Angolan independence. But 
Angolan officials have little reason to trust South Africa. 
While the two governments negotiated, South Africa was 
preparing for its now infamous invasion of Lesotho. 
ing of the Lancaster House Agreement, Rhodesia pro-
vided the MNR with arms, bases, and logistics support 
along the Mozambican border. When Rhodesia became 
Zimbabwe, the MNR's base of operation shifted to South 
Africa. The MNR has inflicted substantial damage on the 
strategic southern provinces of Mozambique as a means 
of discouraging both Zimbabwe and Botswana from ex-
porting their commodities through Maputo. As its mili-
tary activity has intensified, the MNR repeatedly has des-
troyed bridges, railroad lines, communal villages, and 
priority development projects. 
South Africa's involvement in the MNR goes beyond 
planning and providing war materials. "Boer" casualties 
discovered when MNR bases have been overrun, Euro-
pean advisors and instructors in MNR camps, and train-
ing of MNR forces by South African military bases in 
the Transvaal are evidence of the extent of South Africa's 
involvement. MNR forces are resupplied regularly at 
night by South Africa. South African planes flying in-
side Mozambique provide the MNR with detailed infor-
mation concerning Mozambican troop movements. 
Despite this compelling evidence to the contrary, South 
Africa has disavowed all links with the MNR . It main-
tains that its threats and its military activities against 
Mozambique are merely necessary countermeasures in 
response to A NC attacks launched from Mozambique 
and to Mozambique's decision to deploy sophisticated 
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When Rhodesia 
became Zimbabwe, 
South Africa lost its 
only remaining ally in 
southern Africa. Once 
that country attained 
majority rule, it also 
became a principal tar-
get of Pretoria's 
wrath. At an assembly meeting of the African, Carib-
bean, and Pacific European Economic Community held 
in Harare during February 1982, Zimbabwean Prime 
Minister Robert Mugabe denounced South Africa's 
"systematic policy of destabilization" against his govern-
ment. Mugabe charged that between five and six thou-
sand mercenaries, many of them former members of 
Rhodesia's security forces or former supporters of Bishop 
Muzorewa, were being trained by the South African 
defense forces for infiltration into Zimbabwe. Moreover, 
Mugabe implicated Pretoria in an attempt by the Rhode-
sian Front to overthrow his government when sections 
of the white community in Matabeleland in western Zim-
babwe tried to "press the local black population into a 
secession movement." 
Between March and September 1982, the South Africa 
supported MNR sabotaged the oil pipeline between the 
Mozambican port of Beira and Zimbabwe twice and im-
mobilized the railway for seventeen days . In addition, the 
road between Malawi and Zimbabwe suffered six am-
bushes within the same period. 
SEYCHELLES 
ZA NIA ·= 
SEYCHELLES 
COMOROS 
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The Seychelles, a 
group of about fifty-
eight tiny, impover-
ished, and largely un-
inhabited islands, is 
situated approximately 
a thousand miles off 
the east coast of Afri-
ca. It is, therefore, 
an unlikely victim of South African destabilization at-
tempts . Nonetheless , on November 25, 1981 a heavily 
armed band of mercenaries attempted to overthrow the 
Seychelles government. The target of the attempted coup 
was the Socialist regime of President France Albert Rene; 
the intent was to reinstate the pro-Western former presi-
dent James Mancham who had been ousted in 1977. The 
forty-five South African, British, and American mercena-
ries, led by "Mad Mike" Hoare, left South Africa in a 
luxury bus headed for Swaziland. From there they board-
ed a Royal Swazi National Airways flight for the Sey-
chelles main island of Mahe to execute the South Afri-
can plot. 
At Pointe Larue Airport the coup attempt was discov-
ered by a customs officer who found an assault rifle in 
the false bottom of a suitcase. Although the Security 
Force quickly closed in the mercenaries, most escaped 
after hijacking an Air India Boeing 707 . Hoare ordered 
In August 1982 Zimbabwe uncovered further evidence 
of South Africa's aggression. A clash took place between 
South African soldiers and the Zimbabwean military 
forces several miles inside Zimbabwe near the borders of 
Mozambique and South Africa. Three white South Afri-
can soldiers, who formerly had been soldiers in the 
Rhodesian military, were killed while black South 
Africans fled, leaving behind an array of Soviet bloc 
weapons and supplies identified as being from South 
Africa and Ireland. The three dead soldiers were not 
members of the MNR as had been speculated. Accord-
ing to Zimbabwean officials, these men had been trained 
in sabotage and had been part of South Africa's "pre-
paration for an invasion" of Zimbabwe. 
Although General Constand Viljoen, the chief of South 
African military forces , initially denied knowledge of this 
incident , he later confirmed that the South African troops 
had been on an "unauthorized mission." Several South 
African Defense Force members, however, have declared 
that they were deployed regularly in raids on neighbor-
ing black states, including Zimbabwe, and that this raid 
was, therefore, not "unauthorized." The soldiers' dis-
closure was not reflectivee of their higher social consci-
ence but rather resulted from their concern for their col-
leagues' families who would be unable to collect insur-
ance or pension benefits if the official version of the mis-
sion were true. The disaffected soldiers also revealed that 
a destabilization center exists at Pretoria's defense head-
quarters whose sole purpose is the weakening of the 
region's black states. 
the Air India pilot to fly to South Africa, but the embar-
rassed South African government refused landing rights 
at Johannesburg airport . However, the plane was allowed 
to land at Durban Airport where it was surrounded by 
police who arrested the mercenaries . 
The trials following the coup attempt-both in the 
Seychelles and in South Africa-revealed unquestionable 
South African complicity in the coup attempt. During his 
trial for hijacking in South Africa, Hoare confessed that 
the South African government was aware of the coup and 
that the Defense Force had supplied the mercenaries with 
weapons. Georg Schroeder, a German ex-mercenary who 
now runs an export business in South Africa, disclosed 
that he had informed "the authorities" about the coup. 
Relatives of two mercenaries reported that the men had 
received a message of encouragement from Prime Minis-
ter Botha himself on the eve of their departure. 
Among those tried in the Seychelles was Martin Dolin-
chek, a "senior officer" of South Africa's national in-
telligence service. Dolinchek refused legal aid at his trial, 
arguing that his government should arrange for his 
defense. 
The South African government sentenced Hoare and 
his fellow mercenaries to sentences ranging from six 
months to ten years in prison for hijacking. They were 
never tried for attempting to overthrow the government 
of the Seychelles. 
THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION CONFERENCE (SADCC) 
" . .. We call on governments, international institutions, and 
voluntary agencies to give priority to increasing financial 
resources to support southern African efforts toward economic 
liberation and independent economic development. This we 
believe is the route to genuine interdependence and represents 
the best hope for a just and cooperative future for the region 
as a whole. " 
Heads of Government for SADCC Countries 
April I, 1980 
On April 1, 1980 the Heads of Government of nine 
southern African countries met in Lusaka, Zambia and 
signed ''Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation.'' 
The countries included: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe. The document served as a statement of 
their "commitment to pursue policies aimed at the eco-
nomic liberation and integrated development of [their] 
national economies." The organization they formed at 
this meeting, the Southern African Development Coor-
dination Conference (SADCC), would aim toward reduc-
ing their economic dependence on South Africa and 
substituting the mutual interdependence of southern 
African economies. 
In struggling to promote economic development after 
attaining majority rule, these countries had learned that 
economic liberation from South Africa was as vital as 
political liberation from their colonizers. Although they 
had achieved some measure of political freedom, their 
economies still were conceived and organized as functions 
of South Africa. For example, by the end of the Smith 
regime, Zimbabwe's economy was, for all practical pur-
poses, an appendage of South Africa's. South Africa was 
its leading export market, offering preferential tariff rates 
and providing thirty percent of its imports. Nearly one 
hundred percent of Zimbabwean exports and imports not 
destined to or emanating from South Africa had to pass 
through South African ports. 
Similarly, tiny Lesotho has few salable resources other 
than the labor of its 1.3 million citizens, 141,000 of whom 
work in the gold mines and on the farms of the Orange 
Free State, an adjacent South African province. Should 
Pretoria stop the flow of Lesotho's workers, a diplomat 
has warned that, "the government and perhaps the coun-
try wouldn't last a week" because forty percent of 
Lesotho's GNP is derived from wages earned in South 
Africa. 
Six SADCC countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) are land-locked and 
must ship their imports and exports through South 
African ports. Drought-stricken countries have been 
dependent on South Africa for food. Fuel for some coun-
tries must be routed by rail through South Africa. 
In response to their pervasive and untenable 
dependence on South Africa, the nine members of 
SADCC have created a regional organization which will 
function alongside the development apparatus of each 
member state. SADCC's purpose is to decrease South 
Africa' s economic power over the countries and to in-
crease their mutual cooperation. It will help members plan 
and implement necessary development projects which a 
country would be unable-either logistically or financial-
ly-to carry out. SADCC countries will integrate their 
regional productive capabilities and will make their de-
velopment decisions in a cooperative manner. 
Six functional areas of cooperation have been identified 
for special attention by SADCC, including: 
• Transportation and communications. 
• Agriculture and food security. 
• Manpower training. 
• Industrial capacity. 
• Energy needs. 
• A secretariat. 
One SADCC member has primary responsibility for coor-
dinating activities for each of these areas. Other areas of 
cooperation are: a development fund, health, mining, soil 
conservation, and security planning. 
At the organizing conference in 1980, SADCC mem-
bers agreed that strengthening the communication and 
transportation links among them must be a priority if all 
other forms of regional cooperation are to occur. Near-
ly $600 million was pledged by foreign donors for trans-
portation projects which include upgrading Mozambican 
railroad lines and increasing the port capacities of Beira 
and Maputo. Consequently, the SADCC transportation 
network has been successful in redirecting international 
commerce away from South African ports. Zimbabwe, 
for example, exported thirty million tons through Maputo 
in 1980 and more than two hundred million tons in 1981, 
in addition to 166 million tons through the adjacent port 
of Matola. 
South Africa considers SADCC to be a significant de-
velopment worthy of its "special attention." It has, there-
fore, mounted a campaign of economic reprisals in coor-
dination with its military destabilization of SADCC 
member states. South Africa withdrew locomotives and 
technicians it had loaned to Zimbabwe during the Smith 
government, ended preferential trading, and abruptly 
repatriated black Zimbabwean workers. At a meeting of 
South African security officials and the MNR in 1980, 
it was decided that transportation links between SADCC 
countries should be regularly sabotaged as has obvious-
ly been the case. 
Although the nine leaders of SADCC states jointly con-
demned South Africa for its policy of destabilization 
"aimed at SADCC member states," Pretoria continues 
in its campaign against its neighbors . Only the full force 
of international pressure applied against that country is 
likely to deter South African aggression . 
A Quarterly Journal of Opinion on Africa and the Caribbean 
TRANSAFRICA FORUM is a quarterly journal of opinion on 
matters pertaining to Africa and the Caribbean. The journal 
presents an independent review of differing perspectives on 
political, economic and cultural issues affecting black com-
munities globally . The intent of the journal is to provide an 
expanded analytical framework which can be useful to a broad 
audience with a continuing commitment to African and Carib-
bean advancement. 
"TRA NSAFRICA FOR UM publications produce news and in-
formation which have been often exclusive, provocative, and 
very helpful in our deliberations." 
Paul Tsongas (D-Mass.) 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
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formative and insight/ ul writings on African and 
Caribbean affairs available to readers today." 
Andrew Young 
Mayo r, Atlanta, Georgia 
"TransAfrica Forum 's ISSUE BRIEF provides the 
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"We have found TRANSAFRICA FORUM publica-
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Department 
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